Governance can fail dismally even while the formal state remains intact. Yet there is an important, albeit often unrecognized, distinction between failed states and failed governance. In other words, the Westphalian order is undergoing a long-term secular decline that is bringing with it a series of convulsions along with what Nathan Freier terms, “prolific insecurity.” 3 This does not mean that the state is going away anytime soon the state remains critical in defining political order, and will continue to play much of that role for the foreseeable future. Underlying this panorama of actors, and somewhat obscured by the current crises and tensions, is a fundamental global trend in which the nature of governance provided by many states is inadequate and unable to meet the needs, demands, and expectations of their citizens. military planning with its focus on gray zones, irregular operations, and hybrid enemies, as well as its reliance on technological superiority to provide what has been characterized as the “third offset.” 2 Such complexities and uncertainties are increasingly reflected in current U.S. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed that favorable power asymmetries do not guarantee victory, that military power often matters less than political resilience, and that even political success can prove impossible to sustain. At the same time, VNSAs add elements of fluidity and unpredictability, complicating state calculations and rendering desired outcomes uncertain. This is a complex picture in which states, at the very least, remain the major players, and often set the frameworks within which VNSAs operate. In other words, traditional geopolitics is alive and well, but is sharing the stage with a variety of new players that are useful to states but are not necessarily or not fully under state control. Moreover, at times, its close relationship with Pakistani intelligence and military services has hindered efforts to improve relations between India and Pakistan. 1 The relationship is symbiotic and D-Company enjoys a high degree of impunity, while continuing to profit from its extensive portfolio of transnational criminal activities. The organization also provides plausible deniability for ISI and for Pakistan, in return for which Pakistan provides sanctuary and protection. Indeed, D-Company is used by ISI to provide money and logistic support for terrorist actions against India, and for assistance in introducing counterfeit currency into India. In South Asia, D-Company, the criminal organization led by Dawood Ibrahim, is closely allied with Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). On the contrary, they generate their own conflict dynamics and follow strategic imperatives that sometimes complement the actions of their state allies, but, on other occasions, can equally well confound them. They might, on occasion, act as state proxies but, they are not pawns. These VNSAs pursue their own agendas, yet interact and ally with states when it is convenient and advantageous to do so. States in the Middle East, for example, increasingly define national interests in terms of sectarianism however, the civil war in Islam is being played out not only in the direct, competitive dynamic of Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also through the proxies these two states use, including sectarian factions, tribes, warlords, insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The world has entered a period of kaleidoscopic, irregular conflicts in which the reassertion of traditional geopolitical rivalries is inextricably linked with the activities of a bewildering assortment of violent nonstate actors (VNSAs).
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